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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of brandishing a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, and

~

one count of interference with arresting officer (although the Court did not
sentence Mr. Bell for the interference count) in Third Judicial District Court,
the Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)G). The judgment is attached hereto as Addendum

A.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue 1: Whether Mr. Bell's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance or the district court committed plain error when Mr. Bell was convicted
of two counts of aggravated robbery for behavior should have given rise to only one count under the single larceny doctrine.
Standard of Review: A plain error claim and an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. See Carter v. State, 2012 UT 69, <][ 9, 289 P.3d 542; State v. Smit, 2004
UT App 222, <][ 7, 95 P.3d 1203.
Issue 2: Whether Mr. Bell's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when Mr. Bell was convicted of aggravated robbery of a vehicle that
was impossible for him to steal.
1

Q

Standard of Review: An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised
for the first time on appeal is reviewed for correctness. See Carter v. State,
~

2012 UT 69,

<J[

9, 289 P.3d 542; State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222,

<J[

7, 95 P.3d

1203.
Issue 3: Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Bell of
having the necessary intent to commit aggravated robbery despite his defense of voluntary intoxication.
Standard of Review: The Court reverses based on a sufficiency of evidence challenge only if, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, [it] conclude[s] that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77,

<J[

33,

31 P.3d 557.
Preservation: It does not appear from the record that Mr. Bell preserved his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Statement of Grounds for Seeking Review of an Unpreserved Issue:
The Court may review this issue through Mr. Bell's claim that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Dupont, 2002 UT App
378, at *1 n.2 (unpublished).
;'

:: \
..

\IV
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions and statutes can be found in
AddendumB.
U.S. Const. amend. VI
Utah Code§ 76-2-306
Utah Code§ 76-4-101
Utah Code§ 76-4-102
Utah Code § 76-6-301
Utah Code § 76-6-302
Utah Code § 76-6-404
Utah Code § 76-6-404.5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts
On Saturday, May 5, 2013, three women-Moriah Aragon, Brenda
Ruiz, and Kendra Christensen-drove to a store to shop for a cell phone. R.
124 at 81-82. The women drove in a car owned by Ms. Ruiz. R. 124 at 82-83,
105. Although Ms. Ruiz owned the car, she let Ms. Aragon drive, while Ms.
Ruiz sat in the front passenger seat. R. 124 at 82-83, 105. When the women
arrived at the store, Ms. Ruiz left her purse on the car floor near the front
passenger seat of the car and went in the store. R. 124 at 106. When they
3

GI

went in the store, Ms. Aragon kept the keys to Ms. Ruiz's car in her possession. R. 124 at 84-85. The women left the keys to a different rental car in the
;.if)

cup holder of Ms. Ruiz's car. R. 124 at 84-85. While inside the store, they encountered defendant Bryce Bell and saw him acting somewhat strangely. R.
124 at 87-88. Mr. Bell left the store before the women did. R. 124 at 89, 123.
After Mr. Bell left the store, observers saw him looking into other cars
in the parking lot and trying to open the doors. R. 124 at 156, 171-172, 177178. Subsequently, the three women looked out the store window and saw
Mr. Bell sitting in the driver's seat of Ms. Ruiz's car. R. 124 at 89, 123. The
women approached the car and saw Mr. Bell holding the rental car keys and
asking where the ignition was located. R. 124 at 90, 110, 123. Mr. Bell asked
where the ignition was about three or four times, but he never found the ignition. R. 124 at 111, 125. The keys that Mr. Bell was holding were not the
keys to Ms. Ruiz's car and could not be used to start the car he was sitting in.
R. 124 at 106.
Ms. Aragon opened the driver's side door and shouted for Mr. Bell to
leave the car. R. 124 at 90-91, 124-125. The other women also shouted for
Mr. Bell to leave the car. R. 124 at 111. Mr. Bell eventually responded by
pulling out a knife and pointing it at Ms. Aragon. R. 124 at 91, 111, 125. Ms.

4

Aragon stepped away from the car after seeing the knife. R. 124 at 92, 111.
After Ms. Aragon stepped away, Mr. Bell turned and pointed the knife at Ms.
Ruiz, who was standing next to the passenger side door. R. 124 at 94, 111112. Ms. Ruiz remained standing where she was. R. 124 at 95, 112. Mr. Bell
never lunged at Ms. Aragon or Ms. Ruiz, and the knife never injured or even

G;>

touched either of the women. R. 124 at 100-101, 119, 130-131. Mr. Bell then
picked up Ms. Ruiz's purse from the floor near the front passenger seat of the
car and exited the car. R. 124 at 95, 112, 126, 145.
After leaving the car, Mr. Bell dropped the knife and left it near the cell
phone store. R. 124 at 148. Mr. Bell then ran across the parking lot with the
women and an employee of the store following him. R. 124 at 95-96, 113, 127,
136, 146. Two onlookers in a car attempted to block Mr. Bell with the car and
managed to dislodge the purse from him. R. 124 at 96, 113, 127, 156, 172173. They bumped Mr. Bell at least twice with the car, causing him to fall.
R. 124 at 157-158. At one point, Mr. Bell asked the person in the car who
bumped him for a ride, but was refused. R. 124 at 158. Without the purse,
Mr. Bell got up and continued running across the parking lot. R. 124 at 96,
113, 127, 136, 157, 173. Ms. Ruiz picked up her purse and continued running
after Mr. Bell. R. 124 at 114. Subsequently, Mr. Bell dropped the rental car

5

<iJ

keys in nearby bushes. R. 124 at 128-129; R. 125 at 18. Mr. Bell was eventually stopped and apprehended by the police. R. 124 at 96-97, 114, 128; R.
125 at 13-14. All of Ms. Ruiz's belongings were returned to her. R. 124 at
115. According to a police detective, Mr. Bell later stated that he had tried to
take a car. R. 125 at 32, 34. The whole episode lasted a few minutes at most.
R. 124 at 156, 178, 192.
Mr. Bell was under the influence of drugs or alcohol during the incident
~

at issue. He testified that he was not sober at the time. R. 125 at 48. When
walking in the parking lot prior to the incident involving the purse, Mr. Bell
fell down at least twice. R. 124 at 180. R. 124 at 99-101, 152. He looked like
a 'junkie" in bad physical condition, according to the witness who bumped
Mr. Bell with his car and spoke to him. R. 124 at 160. Inside the store, he
was talking loudly, arguing with the store manager, using excessive amounts
of hand sanitizer, repeatedly lifting up his shirt, and talking to himself. R.
124 at 100-102, 107-108, 122, 151. When Mr. Bell left the store, he kicked
the door open rather than opening it normally. R. 124 at 102, 108, 122.
When Mr. Bell ran, he was wobbling. R. 124 at 102. When Mr. Bell held up
his hand as if to show something to the store manager, there was nothing in

6

his hand. R. 124 at 153. He acted erratically and was "all over the place." R.
124 at 160, 180, 189.
After being arrested, Mr. Bell told police officers that he was on methamphetamine and that he had not slept for three days. R. 125 at 23. Mr.
Bell answered questions clearly but was moaning while doing so. R. 125 at
24-25. Mr. Bell vomited at the police station and was eventually taken to the
hospital. R. 125 at 23-24, 32-33. The police detective had Mr. Bell sent to the
hospital because he believed the jail would not accept Mr. Bell in his condition. R. 125 at 32-33. Immediately after the events at issue took place, Mr.
Bell had no memory of going to the cell phone store or of any of the events involving the car, knife, and purse. R. 125 at 46-47.
While at the cell phone store, Mr. Bell interacted with a store employee
and was understandable and responded coherently to questions. R. 124 at
141-143. The store employee did not smell alcohol while speaking with Mr.
Bell, but the store employee believed Mr. Bell was high. R. 124 at 151-152.
While Mr. Bell did not recall anything about the alleged crimes, he did remember some details about conversations with a friend beforehand, about
drinking a beer beforehand, and going to the location where the crimes at issue were alleged to take place. R. 125 at 49-50. He also remembered the tat-

7

too of a hospital worker who attended to him after the police took him for
medical attention. R. 125 at 46-47.
Statement of Proceedings
On May 8, 2013, the District Attorney for Salt Lake County filed an information charging Mr. Bell with five crimes: two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and interference with an arresting officer. R. 1. At a preliminary hearing on June 20, 2013, one of the aggravated
assault counts was stricken, but Mr. Bell was bound over for trial on the four
remaining counts. R. 23. The prosecution subsequently filed an amended information reflecting the removal of one count of aggravated assault. R. 33. A
jury trial was held on October 8 and 9, 2013. R. 77-81. The jury found Mr.
~

Bell guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of brandishing a
dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel (a lesser included offense of aggravated assault), and one count of interference with an arresting officer. R. 85; R.
125 at 90. On December 2, 2013, the district court sentenced Mr. Bell to two
prison terms of five years to life, and one term of less than a year, with the
terms to run concurrently (the court did not sentence Mr. Bell to any time for
interference with an arresting officer). R. 105-06, 132-33; R. 126 at 14-15.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A jury convicted Mr. Bell of two counts of aggravated robbery when the
facts at issue only allow one count. Pursuant to the single larceny doctrine,

G;:;

the Court should have instructed the jury that it could consider convicting
Mr. Bell of, at most, one count of aggravated robbery.
The criminal episode involving Mr. Bell lasted only a few minutes. Acting on one impulse, he was accused of entering a car that was not his, brandishing a knife when confronted, then exiting the car with a purse that was
inside (without ever starting the car or driving it anywhere).

Mr. Bell

dropped the purse and was arrested shortly thereafter. There was a single
victim, a single location, and no lapse of time between the events. Yet the
prosecution still charged Mr. Bell with two counts of aggravated robberyone for the car and one for the purse. The district court instructed the jury
on both counts, and Mr. Bell's trial counsel did not object. Established law
dictates that the episode only justified one count, and it was both plain error
and ineffective assistance of counsel to allow two counts. The harm to Mr.
Bell is obvious and drastic-the jury convicted on both counts, he has two
first-degree felonies on his record, and his prison time increased dramatically.

9
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Even if the facts gave rise to two separate criminal charges (which they
did not), Mr. Bell should not have been charged with and convicted of aggravated robbery of the car. It was literally impossible for Mr. Bell to take the
car because he never had the keys to it. He had no way to turn on the car,
and he never took it anywhere. Utah law allows a defense of factual impossi~

bility for aggravated robbery, but Mr. Bell's trial counsel did not present or
argue such a defense. It was ineffective assistance of counsel to not make a
defense that should have eliminated one of the charges.
Finally, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that Mr.
i-i>

Bell had the requisite intent to commit either count of aggravated robbery
due to his voluntary intoxication. Multiple witnesses establish that Mr. Bell
did not have control of his actions and did not have the ability to form the intent to commit aggravated robbery. Mr. Bell had taken drugs and alcohol
and has no memory of any of the events at issue. Even the evidence relied on
by the prosecution actually demonstrates Mr. Bell's impaired state. After being confronted while sitting in the car, Mr. Bell asked the car owner where
the ignition was located. Later, while running away, Mr. Bell was bumped
several times by a moving car driven by an onlooker attempting to stop him .

.;;)

After being bumped, Mr. Bell asked the driver for a ride. This is not the be-

10

havior of a person acting rationally. Mr. Bell was asking questions and seeking help from people yelling at him and hitting him with a car. Mr. Bell was
so intoxicated that he did not comprehend basic facts. Accordingly, the ag-

Q

gravated robbery convictions should not stand.
ARGUMENT

I.

IT WAS WRONG TO CONVICT MR. BELL OF TWO COUNTS OF
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
The criminal episode involving Mr. Bell lasted for a few minutes at the

most. He got in a car, looked unsuccessfully for the ignition, showed a knife
when confronted, exited the car with a purse, and ran. Regardless of whether
he had the requisite criminal intent (addressed below), Mr. Bell's actions did
not give rise to two first-degree felonies. Mr. Bell was charged with and convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery-one for attempting to take the
car (even though this was impossible, also addressed below), and one for taking the purse. Because there was one criminal episode and one victim, the
single larceny doctrine dictates that only one aggravated robbery count was
allowed. The second count must be vacated.

A.

The Facts Only Give Rise to One Criminal Count.

Under both the ineffective assistance of counsel standard and the plain
error standard, Mr. Bell experienced harm and prejudice.

11

See State v.

@

McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, 'Il 42, 302 P.3d 844. ("Under either theory, a defendant must demonstrate that, absent the error or deficient performance,
~

there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result."). The jury convicted Mr. Bell of two first degree felonies, while the law dictates that he
should have been, at most, convicted of one.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution applies
against the States. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969).
The Double Jeopardy Clause embodies three separate protections: (1) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) pro-

;;p

tection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and
(3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. Bernat v.

Allphin, 2005 UT 1,

<JI

11, 106 P.3d 707, as corrected (Apr. 1, 2005) (citing

Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1984)). The
third of these three protections-"multiple punishments for the same offense"-is at issue here.
To prevent "multiple punishments for the same offense," most jurisdictions, including Utah, have adopted what is known as the "single larceny doctrine." 37 A.L.R.3d 1407 (1971) ("The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
.::;,

follow ... the so-called 'single larceny doctrine."'). This doctrine, as explained

12

by the Utah Supreme Court more than 100 years ago, holds that "[w]here
many articles are stolen at one time, there is only one theft, whether the
ownership is one or many." State v. Mickel, 65 P. 484, 485 (Utah 1901). Utah
courts have on several occasions reaffirmed this doctrine, holding that "a single larcenous taking of property, whether owned by one or several individuals, will be treated as a single criminal offense." 1 State v. Barker, 624 P.2d
694, 695 (Utah 1981); State v. Kimbrel, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980); see al-

so State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71,

<J[<J[

13-15, 299 P.3d 625.

In applying this doctrine, the "crucial consideration [is] the intent of the
thief." Kimbrel, 620 P.2d at 518. Thus,
the general test as to whether there are separate offenses or one offense is whether the evidence discloses one general intent or discloses separate and distinct intents. The particular facts and circumstances
of each case determine this question. If there is but
one intention, one general impulse, and one plan,
even though there is a series of transactions, there is
but one offense.

Id. To Mr. Bell's knowledge, no Utah court has described the factors relevant
to determining whether the "evidence discloses" that just "one offense" has

1

The "underlying purpose and policy" of this doctrine is twofold: to (1) "prevent the aggregation of criminal penalties for a single act," and (2) to "resolve
doubts in the enforcement of the penal code against the imposition of a
harsher punishment." State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1981).
13
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been committed, but the Virginia Court of Appeals has noted that factors to
consider include, among others, "the location of the items stolen, the lapse of
vJ

time between their taking, the general and specific intent of the thief, the
number of owners, and whether intervening events occurred between the takings." See Richardson v. Commonwealth, 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Va. Ct. App.
1997).
This Court invoked this rule and applied some of these factors to inval-

~

idate one of two aggravated robbery offenses in State v. Irvin, 2007 UT App
319, 169 P.3d 798. There, the defendant approached the counter at a conven-

~

ience store and asked the store clerk for a pack of cigarettes and a cigar.
When the clerk turned around to retrieve the items, the defendant came
around the counter, brandished a knife, and ordered the clerk to turn over
the contents of the cash register. Id.

<JI

2. At about the same time, the de-

fendant demanded the keys to the clerk's car. Id. After locking the clerk in a
back room, the defendant left the convenience store in the clerk's car. The
defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery.
On appeal, this Court vacated one of defendant's two aggravated robbery convictions. As the Court explained, "[t]he facts and circumstances of
i.iJ

th[e] case show that only one act of aggravated robbery occurred." Id. <I[ 19.

14

The defendant took both pieces of property-the car keys and the cash-in
"a matter of seconds," and the entire episode lasted all of a "few minutes." Id.
Because the taking of the money and the keys "was part of 'one intention, one

G

general impulse, and one plan,"' the defendant "committed only one aggravated robbery." Id.; see Richardson, 489 S.E.2d at 700 ("[T]he question to be
asked is whether the thefts, although occurring successively within a brief
time frame, were part of one impulse.").
Also closely on point is the Ohio Court of Appeals' decision in State v.

Fischer, 368 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977). In that case, the defendant
stole a pickup truck with automotive tools in it. The truck would not run for
long (it was later found "in the general vicinity'' of its "owner's residence"),
but the defendant took the automotive tools from it and tried to sell them. Id.

Q

at 333. The defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of theft, one
for the pickup truck and one for the automotive tools. Again, the court invalidated the second conviction. As it explained, "[t]he initial theft of the pickup
truck was also a theft of everything that was in it at the time." Id. at 334.
r~-c

~

That the defendant eventually abandoned the truck because he "could not get
[it] started" was of little moment-the critical point was that the single theft
the defendant committed was of "the truck and its contents." Id.

15
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Here, the single larceny doctrine dictates that convicting Mr. Bell of
two counts of aggravated robbery was contrary to the law. In analyzing the
factors courts consider in determining whether the doctrine applies, they
weigh heavily in Mr. Bell's favor. First, the items taken were in the same location. The purse was located inside the car. Mr. Bell had to enter the car to
have access to the purse. Everything happened inside of a single, enclosed
location. Second, there was no lapse of time between taking the purse and
.4!)

car. In truth, the car never was taken, as Mr. Bell had the wrong keys and it
was impossible for him to take the car. Still, Mr. Bell's entry of the car and
picking up the purse happened within seconds of each other. This is not a
case where any appreciable time elapsed between two different events.
Third, Ms. Ruiz was the owner of both the car and the purse. She was the only victim of any robbery by Mr. Bell.

Finally, there were no intervening

events between the takings. Mr. Bell entered the car, fished around for the
ignition, picked up the purse, and exited the car. There was no break in between. All of Mr. Bell's actions were part of one continuous episode that lasted only a matter of seconds.
Review of the facts in Irvin and Fischer makes it clear that application
of the single larceny doctrine is even more appropriate in this case than in
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those cases. In Irvin, the defendant brandished a knife and demanded the
contents of a cash register from the clerk at a convenience store. The defendant then locked the clerk in a back room. After the clerk was locked up, the

~

defendant left and took the clerk's car. The intervening act of locking the
clerk in the back room was not enough to create two separate robberies. In
the present case, there was no similar break in the action. Mr. Bell sat in the
car for a few moments fumbling with the wrong keys, then took a purse from
the car and left. It was all part of one impulse, with nothing else occurring in
the interim.
In Fischer, the defendant took tools from a truck he stole after he had
to leave the truck behind because it would no longer run. The fact that he
first drove away with the truck and then later carried off items that were inside the truck did not create two different thefts. The intent to take the
truck-even though the truck stopped working and the defendant ultimately
could not drive it-constituted an attempt to take everything inside the
truck. Here, Mr. Bell did not go nearly as far as the defendant in Fischer.
Mr. Bell never turned the car on or drove it anywhere. The State contended
that Mr. Bell intended to steal Ms. Ruiz's car when he opened the door and
got inside. The jury agreed and convicted Mr. Bell. This intent necessarily
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encompassed all items within the car, including Ms. Ruiz's purse. In short,
the law only allows one charge of aggravated robbery on these facts, not two.
Given the applicability of the single larceny doctrine, it is clear that Mr.
Bell was greatly prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel and/or plain
error. The harm is obvious-he was convicted of two felonies when it should
have been, at most, one. Mr. Bell was sentenced to two terms of five years to
life in prison when it should have been, at most, one. The matrix calculated
by the Board of Pardons and Parole to determine Mr. Bell's time behind bars
accounts for two first degree felonies instead of just one. The Court should
vacate one of Mr. Bell's convictions for aggravated robbery.

B.

Allowing Mr. Bell to be Tried and Convicted of Two
Counts of Aggravated Robbery Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Plain Error, or Both.

The Court allowed two counts of aggravated robbery to go to the jury
and imposed two sentences after the jury convicted Mr. Bell of both counts.
While Mr. Bell's trial counsel argued that Mr. Bell should not be convicted of
any crimes, counsel did not object to Mr. Bell being charged with two counts
of aggravated robbery or the district court's instruction to the jury that it
could convict Mr. Bell of two counts of aggravated robbery. The resulting
harm to Mr. Bell from this ineffective assistance and plain error is obvious.
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If the jury only had the ability to convict him of one count of aggravated rob-

bery, he would have one less felony on his record. His prison time would be
reduced, and his path to rehabilitation would be greatly eased.
1.

Ineffective Assistance

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right "to
have the assistance of counsel for [their] defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. In

Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that a person is denied his or her Sixth Amendment right to the "assistance of counsel"
if counsel fails to provide "reasonably effective assistance" and the defendant
can show that, but for that failure, "the result of the proceeding would have
been different." 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). In short, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two components-deficient "performance" and resulting "prejudice." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81,

<JI

~

85, 150 P.3d 480. Mr.

Bell satisfies both components here.
Utah courts presume that counsel performs reasonably and have often
stated that counsel does not perform deficiently as long as his or her actions
are part of "an acceptable trial strategy." State v. Graham, 2013 UT App 73,
<I[

15, 299 P.3d 644. No matter how strong the presumption in favor of trial

counsel, however, this much is clear: counsel performs deficiently if his or

G;;
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her actions "cannot be construed to be a component of any rational defense
strategy." State

V.

Ott, 2010 UT 1, en 37, 247 P.3d 344.

Whether defense counsel has followed a rational strategy at trial depends on the circumstances of the case. See State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38,
en 17, 248 P.3d 70 (holding that, "under the circumstances, counsel's failure to

request an instruction that provided a clear explanation that the burden actually shifted to the State to disprove the defense ... cannot be attributed to
any reasonable trial strategy" (emphasis added)).

A reasonable defense

strategy in one case may just as easily be an unreasonable defense strategy
in the next case, largely depending on the actions taken and strategy adopted
by the prosecutor. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 ("Representation is an art,
and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or
even brilliant in another.").
One manner in vv:hich counsel can perform deficiently is by failing to
"thorough[ly] investigat[e]" the law. Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, en 140,
267 P.3d 232; see United States v. Demeree, 108 F. App'x 602, 605 (10th Cir.
2004) ("Although we do not require clairvoyance, counsel is obligated to research relevant law to make an informed decision whether certain avenues
will be fruitful."). In the recent words of the U.S. Supreme Court, "[a]n attor-
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ney's ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case combined
with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a quintessential
example of unreasonable performance under Strickland." Hinton v. Alabama,

Q

134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014).
Here, certainly no "acceptable trial strategy" would have led defense
counsel to allow Mr. Bell to face two counts of aggravated robbery when he
should have faced only one. No set of circumstances exists in which defending against two felonies is better than defending against one. The obvious
risk is that the jury might convict on both counts, which is precisely what
happened here. It appears that defense counsel was not aware of the single

Q

larceny doctrine, discussed infra. Defense counsel never made the argument
that only one aggravated robbery count should go forward and never objected

G

to the judge instructing the jury on two counts. Regardless of counsel's understanding of the law, there was no legitimate basis _for allowing two counts,
and the failure to object to this constituted deficient performance. See Hin-

ton, 134 S. Ct. at 1089.
2.

Plain Error.

"To succeed under the plain error exception, a party must demonstrate
that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
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court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan

River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84,

<J{

147, 299 P.3d 990. The plain error

standard is similar to the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. See,
-~

e.g., State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86,

<JI

63, 55 P.3d 573.

As described in detail below, it was error for the district court to allow

Mr. Bell to face two counts of aggravated robbery, to instruct the jury that it
could convict Mr. Bell on two counts of aggravated robbery, and to sentence
Mr. Bell for two counts of aggravated robbery. The error should have been
obvious because controlling precedent holds that two counts of aggravated
robbery may not be charged for the kind of single-impulse actions that happened here. The single larceny doctrine, as established by controlling Utah
case law, dictates that the circumstances giving rise to the criminal allegations against Mr. Bell only justify one count of aggravated robbery, not two.
The harm from the error was the most serious harm possible. The jury convicted Mr. Bell of two counts of aggravated robbery when it should only have
had the ability to, at most, convict for one.
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II.

IT WAS ERROR TO CONVICT MR. BELL OF AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY WHEN IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO TAKE
THE CAR AT ISSUE.
Even if it was appropriate to charge Mr. Bell with two counts of aggra-

~

vated robbery (which it was not), the conviction for aggravated robbery of the
car cannot stand. According to the prosecution, Mr. Bell committed aggravated robbery when he sat inside the car and unsuccessfully looked for the
ignition, then brandished a knife when confronted by the car owner and her
friends. The snag in this theory is that it was impossible for Mr. Bell to take
the car. He never had the keys to it and had no ability to turn the car on. On
this evidence, the most Mr. Bell could be convicted of was attempted robbery,
not aggravated robbery. The conviction for aggravated robbery of the car
must be vacated.

A.

f;";

~

Allowing Mr. Bell to be Tried and Convicted of Aggravated
Robbery Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel or
Plain Error or Both.

As set forth above, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two
components-deficient "performance" and resulting "prejudice."
2006 UT 81,

<JI

Menzies,

85. Mr. Bell's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

not presenting an argument based on factual impossibility and by not requesting a jury instruction regarding factual impossibility. It was also ineffective assistance not to contest Mr. Bell's conviction for aggravated robbery
23
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based on the car. Mr. Bell had no ability to take the car because he had the
wrong keys. He literally could not accomplish the robbery even if he wanted
..;

to (which the jury found that he did). The law allows a defense of factual impossibility in such circumstances. There was no sufficient reason for Mr.
Bell's trial counsel not to press this defense.

B.

The Evidence Does Not Support a Count of Aggravated
Robbery Related to the Car.

While factual impossibility is not a defense to a crime charged as an attempt, see Utah Code § 76-4-101(3)(b) ("A defense to the offense of attempt
does not arise . . . due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have
been committed if the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed
them to be."), Mr. Bell was not charged with an attempt crime. The State decided to pursue aggravated robbery rather than attempted robbery under section 76-4-101 (which would have been a second-degree felony under section
..;J

76-4-102). Aggravated robbery is a first-degree felony. Utah Code § 76-6302.
The aggravated robbery statute does not contain a prohibition against
the defense of factual or legal impossibility. "When interpreting statutes,"
the "primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the legislature."

State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, il 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (citation omitted). Legisla-
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tive intent is discerned by first looking at the plain language of the statute
itself. Id. It should be assumed that the legislature used each term advisedly. Id. Applying these basic principles of statutory interpretation, the fact

G

that the prohibition against a factual impossibility defense is not found in the
robbery or aggravated robbery statutes means that the defense is available.
The Legislature could have included the prohibition on the factual impossibility defense in the aggravated robbery statue itself, but it chose not to. Thus,
factual impossibility applies here and requires vacation of Mr. Bell's conviction for aggravated robbery.
The case of State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991), is illustrative.
In Johnson, the defendant was convicted of several counts of attempted firstdegree murder of her husband. One of these charges stemmed from the de-

G

fondant's attempts to poison her husband using a substance called oxalic acid. Id. at 1153. The Utah Supreme Court noted that the State did not prove
that the oxalic acid was actually a poison or lethal substance or that Johnson
had administered it in amounts that would be lethal to her husband. Id. at
1158. The State had contended that it did not matter if it had proved these
facts because, under the attempt statute, factual impossibility was no defense. Id. In other words, according to the State, the fact that the defendant
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had intended to poison her husband was enough to convict her, even if her attempt had no chance of succeeding.
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and stated:
We agree that under [the attempt] statute factual impossibility generally is no defense to an attempt charge. However,
where the charge is attempted first degree murder, which is distinguishable under section 76-5-202(1) from attempted second
degree murder only by the presence of specified objective aggravating circumstances, the legislature must have intended that
the aggravating circumstances actually be present. Therefore, a
subjective mistake by the actor as to the presence of an aggravating circumstance required by section 76-5-202(1) would be a defense to a charge of attempted first degree murder.

Id. at 1158. Similarly, the plain language of the aggravated robbery statute
under which Mr. Bell was charged has specific requirements. In contrast to
the general attempt statute, it does not proscribe factual impossibility as a
defense. This makes it even more appropriate here than in Johnson to vacate
the conviction. In this case, the crime was not brought as an attempt offense.
Mr. Bell was charged and convicted of taking a car that he did not have the
ability to take.

An examination of the applicable law and facts in this case demonstrates that it was indeed factually impossible for Mr. Bell to have committed
the aggravated robbery of the car. An aggravated robbery is a robbery committed with a dangerous weapon. See Utah Code § 76-6-302. A robbery is
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committed when one uses force or fear of immediate force in the course of a
theft or wrongful appropriate. See id. § 76-6-301. Both theft and wrongful
appropriation include obtaining unauthorized control over the property of an-

~

other. See id. §§ 76-6-404, 76-6-404.5. Mr. Bell never obtained control over
Ms. Ruiz's car because he never had the keys to Ms. Ruiz's car. The keys that
Mr. Bell found in the car were for a separate rental car. The keys to Ms.
Ruiz's car were safely in Ms. Aragon's purse the entire time and never in Mr.
Bell's possession. For that matter, the car ignition was not a traditional one
into which Mr. Bell could have tried to force the wrong keys. The car had a
new type of ignition that would only work if the proper keys were inside the
car. 2 There was literally no way Mr. Bell could have taken the car because he
did not have the necessary instruments to turn the car on. It was physically

Q

impossible for Mr. Bell to take Ms. Ruiz's car. Not surprisingly, he quickly
exited the car and never obtained possession of it.
Given these facts, it was inappropriate for the jury to convict Mr. Bell
for a crime that it was impossible for him to actually commit. The prejudice
to Mr. Bell is clear, as described above. He was convicted of two counts of ag-

2

In addition to it being impossible to start the car with the wrong keys in the
ignition, there was no evidence presented at trial that Mr. Bell attempted to
do such a thing or intended to make such an attempt.
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gravated robbery when he only should have been on trial for one count related to Ms. Ruiz's purse. It was impossible for Mr. Bell to take Ms. Ruiz's car,
vJ

yet he was still convicted for aggravated robbery of the car. Thus, it was ineffective assistance for trial counsel not to object to the second aggravated robbery count and not to present the factual impossibility defense to the jury. It
was also ineffective assistance not to raise any objections to second aggravated robbery conviction by the jury. The aggravated robbery conviction related
to the car should be vacated.

III.
~

IN LIGHT OF MR. BELL'S VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION,
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S FINDING THAT MR. BELL HAD THE SPECIFIC INTENT TO COMMIT AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
The State did not put on sufficient evidence to overcome Mr. Bell's de-

fense that voluntary intoxication caused him to not have the requisite intent
to commit aggravated robbery. While Mr. Bell's trial counsel argued that Mr.
~

Bell should be acquitted due to voluntary intoxication, counsel did not preserve the argument that the State's evidence on this topic was insufficient.
This constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. As set out above, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two components-deficient "performance" and resulting "prejudice." Menzies, 2006 UT 81,
fies both components here.
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85. Mr. Bell satis-

Mr. Bell's trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to move for a directed verdict or otherwise objecting to the sufficiency of the State's evidence
regarding voluntary intoxication. There is no conceivable "trial strategy" that
would have led defense counsel to leave the sufficiency of the State's evidence
unchallenged. See Graham, 2013 UT App 73,

CJ[

15.

Defense counsel's failure to challenge the State's evidence prejudiced
Mr. Bell. But for that error, "there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant." State v. Parker, 2000
UT 51,

<JI

10, 4 P.3d 778. If the district court had ruled that there was insuffi-

cient evidence to overcome the voluntary intoxication defense, then Mr. Bell
would have been acquitted on both counts of aggravated robbery. He would
not have been convicted of any felonies and would likely not be in prison.
A.

Marshaling Evidence

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Mr. Bell must "marshal
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). In compliance with that requirement, Mr. Bell presents the following evidence regarding voluntary intoxication and Mr. Bell's intent to commit
aggravated robbery.
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While at the cell phone store, Mr. Bell interacted with a store employee
and was understandable and responded appropriately to questions. R. 124 at
viJ

141-143. Mr. Bell testified that he did not recall anything about the alleged
crimes, but he did remember some details about conversations with a friend
beforehand, about drinking a beer beforehand, and going to the location
where the crimes at issue were alleged to take place. R. 125 at 49-50. He also remembered the tattoo of a hospital worker who attended to him after the
police took him for medical attention. R. 125 at 46-47.
While Ms. Bell was sitting in Ms. Ruiz's car, Ms. Ruiz and her friends
approached the car and saw Mr. Bell holding the rental car keys and asking
where the ignition was located. R. 124 at 90, 110, 123. Mr. Bell asked where
the ignition was about three or four times, but he never found the ignition.
R. 124 at 111, 125.
After the women shouted for Mr. Bell to leave the car, Mr. Bell responded by pulling out a knife and pointing it at Ms. Aragon. R. 124 at 91,
111, 125. After Ms. Aragon stepped away, Mr. Bell turned and pointed the
knife at Ms. Ruiz, who was standing next to the passenger-side door. R. 124
at 94, 111-112. Mr. Bell then picked up Ms. Ruiz's purse from the floor near
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the front passenger seat of the car, and he exited the car. R. 124 at 95, 112,
126, 145.
After leaving the car, Mr. Bell dropped the knife and ran across the
parking lot with the women and an employee of the store following him. R.
124 at 95-96, 113, 127, 136, 146. Two onlookers in a car attempted to block

Ci)

Mr. Bell with the car and managed to dislodge the purse from him. R. 124 at
96, 113, 127, 156, 172-173. They bumped Mr. Bell at least twice with the car,
causing him to fall. R. 124 at 157-158. At one point, Mr. Bell asked the person in the car who bumped him for a ride, but was refused. R. 124 at 158.
Subsequently, Mr. Bell threw the rental car keys in nearby bushes. R. 124 at
128-129; R. 125 at 18. Mr. Bell was eventually stopped and apprehended by
the police. R. 124 at 96-97, 114, 128; R. 125 at 13-14. According to a police

GJ

detective, Mr. Bell later stated that he had tried to take a car. R. 125 at 32,
34.

Q

B.

The Evidence Introduced at Trial was Insufficient to Find
that Mr. Bell Had the Requisite Intent, Given His Intoxicated Condition.

There is a reasonable probability that, had defense counsel challenged
the sufficiency of the State's evidence at trial, the outcome would have been
different. The State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove that Mr.

~
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Bell had the specific intent to commit aggravated robbery, given his intoxicated state.
With the only direct evidence of Mr. Bell's intent being his testimony
that he did not intend to commit any crimes and has no memory of doing so,
the State was forced to rely on Mr. Bell's actions and the surrounding circumstances to prove Mr. Bell's mental state. But as the Utah Supreme Court
explained some time ago, a person's actions do not themselves "raise the presumption that [they] were done with the specific intent required to prove the
offense." State v. Castonguay, 663 P .·2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983) (emphasis
added). Instead, "[a]ll the circumstances, when taken together, must admit of
no other hypothesis than of guilt to warrant conviction." Id.
"[W]hen intoxication ... negates the existence of the state of mind required for the commission of the crime, the act or omission which otherwise
would constitute an offense is purged of its criminality." State v. Potter, 627
P.2d 75, 79 (Utah 1981); see also Utah Code § 76-2-306. In order for intoxication to be a valid defense, "one must be so under the influence of alcohol [or
drugs] that at the time of the alleged offense, he was then and there incapable of forming the necessary intent, namely, having a conscious objective or
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desire" to engage in the criminal conduct. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51
(Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1981)).
Evidence of intoxication must have relevance to the defendant's mental

~

state at the time of the crime. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89-90 (Utah 1982).
For the defense to be successful, it is necessary to show more than the de-

Q

fondant had been drinking or using drugs. See id. It is necessary to show
that the defendant's mind was affected to such an extent that he did not have
the capacity to form the requisite specific intent or purpose to commit robbery. See id.
The defense of voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific intent
crimes if it serves to negate the mens rea element. Adams v. State, 2005 UT
62, 'Il 22, 123 P.3d 400. Aggravated robbery is a specific intent crime. See
Utah Code §§ 76-6-301, -302; Potter, 627 P.2d at 78. In Adams, the defendant
sought post-conviction relief after being convicted of rape. Adams, 2005 UT
62, 'Il 2. The defendant alleged that he was drunk to the point of losing the
ability to comprehend his circumstances, identity, and all memory of events
in his inebriated state. The trial transcript indicated that both he and his
former girlfriend testified to his drunkenness at trial. Id. 'Il 22. The Supreme
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Court determined that the defendant's voluntary intoxication defense was potentially meritorious and reversed to require a hearing on the subject. Id.
Here, Mr. Bell testified that immediately after the events at issue took
place, he did not recall anything about the alleged crimes due to his intoxicated state. R. 125 at 46-50. Like the defendant in Adams, Mr. Bell's consumption of drugs and alcohol deprived him of the ability to comprehend the
circumstances or even remember his own actions. Mr. Bell's testimony and
the testimony of several witnesses revealed Mr. Bell's highly intoxicated
state. A witness testified that she saw Mr. Bell fall down twice in the parking lot prior to the incident, just while walking. R. 124 at 180. R. 124 at 99101, 152. Another witness testified that Mr. Bell looked like a 'Junkie" in bad
physical condition. R. 124 at 160. Inside the store, Mr. Bell was talking loudly, using excessive amounts of hand sanitizer, repeatedly lifting up his shirt,
and talking to himself. R. 124 at 100-102, 107-108, 122, 151. When Mr. Bell
held up his hand as if to show something to the store manager, there was
nothing in his hand. R. 124 at 153. The store manager thought Mr. Bell was
high. R. 124 at 151-152. A witness testified that Mr. Bell acted erratically,
"all over the place." R. 124 at 160, 180, 189. After being arrested, Mr. Bell
told police officers that he was on methamphetamine and that he had not
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slept for three days. R. 125 at 23. Mr. Bell answered police officer questions,
but he was moaning while he was asked questions. R. 125 at 24-25. Mr. Bell
vomited at the police station and was eventually taken to the hospital. R.
125 at 23-24, 32-33. The police sent Mr. Bell to the hospital because they believed the jail would not accept Mr. Bell in his condition. R. 125 at 32-33.
This testimony from multiple witnesses demonstrates the severe nature of Mr. Bell's impairment. Mr. Bell's erratic behavior confirms his testimony that he did not know what he was doing during the events in question.
The evidence presented by the State was insufficient to show that Mr. Bell
acted intentionally, despite being intoxicated. In its closing argument, the
State focused on the fact that Mr. Bell had some memories of that day, like of
a hospital worker with a tattoo. The State suggested that Mr. Bell conven-

G;;

iently only remembered facts unrelated to the crimes he was charged with.
But this type of argument is not evidence. If anything, the fact that Mr. Bell

1.··,
\ll,il

remembered some pieces of events bolsters his credibility and showed that he
was making a candid attempt to recollect all that he could. No evidence presented by the State indicated that at the critical time-when Mr. Bell entered and sat in Ms. Ruiz's car with a knife-that he was in control of his
mental faculties.
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The State focused on some of Mr. Bell's interactions with others to
show that he must have known what he was doing. But the evidence cited by
the State actually supports Mr. Bell's testimony that he was not acting rationally and was not in control of himself. The State argued that Mr. Bell's
request for a ride from the person who bumped him with a car showed that
he knew enough to try to escape. To the contrary, requesting a ride from a
person who has bumped you with a car makes no sense at all. The person
~

was clearly trying to stop Mr. Bell and not assist him. To ask for a ride in
that situation indicates Mr. Bell did not have his senses about him and could
not think clearly. Similarly, the State argued that Mr. Bell asking Ms. Ruiz
and Ms. Aragon where the ignition was located shows that he was aware
enough to try to turn the car on. But asking that question of alleged robbery
victims who are shouting to get out of their car is not rational behavior. It
demonstrates an inability to comprehend the situation. Clearly, the women
vJ

were not going to help Mr. Bell and did not want him there. Mr. Bell's communications indicate he did not comprehend this basic fact.
The State also made much of Mr. Bell's alleged ability to converse appropriately with the store employee. Although the store employee said Mr.
Bell answered questions as if he understood them, the same employee testi-
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fied that Mr. Bell was acting unusually, using excessive amounts of hand
sanitizer and raising his hand to show him an object that did not exist. The
store employee believed Mr. Bell was high. Similarly, a police officer testified

~

that Mr. Bell said he tried to steal a car, but the same officer said that Mr.
Bell was moaning while responding and vomited in the holding cell. The

Q

same officer requested that Mr. Bell be transported to the hospital because he
did not believe the jail would accept him given his condition.
Taking the evidence as a whole, the picture becomes clear that Mr. Bell
was severely intoxicated and not in his right mind. He did not have control of
his mental facilities. The testimony of numerous witnesses, including the
testimony emphasized by the State, only corroborates Mr. Bell's testimony
that he was not making knowing or intentional decisions at the time in question due to his intoxication. Simply put, Mr. Bell did not have the ability to
intentionally commit aggravated robbery. Accordingly, there was insufficient
evidence to support his convictions, and this Court should vacate them.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should reverse Mr. Bell convictions for two
counts of aggravated robbery.
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DATED this 9th day of March, 2015.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

vs.
BRYCE D BELI,,
Defendant.
custody: Jail

MINOTES

CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

case No: 131904431 FS
Judge:
ROBIN W REESE
Date:
December 2, 2013

PRESENT

Clerk:

magdalea

Prosecutor: EVBRSHED, NATHAN J

Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARLAND, ANDREA J

DEFENDANT INFORMATION

Date o.f birth: December 15, 1982

Sheriff Office#: 253621
Aud.io
Tape Number:
S-45
Tape Count: 12:27

CHARGES
Degree Felony
- Disposition: 10/09/2013
2. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/09/2013
3. THREAT/USE OF D~GBROUS ,nm.PO~ IN FIGHT. Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/09/2013

1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st

Plea: Guilty

Guilty
Guilty
Class A Misdemeanor

Guilty

·

Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
SENTENCE PRJ:SON

Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate tel:111
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on .the defendant's conviction of THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS
WEAPON ~N FXGHT a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed one year in the Utah
State Prison.

To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation·to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
Printed: 12/09/13 09:18:50
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SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE

Prison time to run concurrent.

_/)_,_L_._r_,_/_z._oJ3

Date: _ _

Printed: 12/09/13 09:18:50
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AddendumB
,
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Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights, USCA CONST Amend ....

!United States Code Annotated
!Constitution of the United States
IAnnotated
!Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos)
U.S.CA. Const. Amend. VI-Jury Trials
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights
Currentness

<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in three separate documents. Notes of Decisions for
subdivisions I through XX are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXI through
XXIX, see the second document for Amend. VI. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXX through XXXIII,
see the third document for Amend. VI.>

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Notes of Decisions (5159)

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury Trials, USCA CONST Amend. VI-Jury Trials
Current through P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, 113-291, and 113-295) approved 12-19-2014
Egd of Document

.r,, 2015 Thc.lll1son Reuters. No claim 10 original U.S. Government Works.

\11✓estlav-1Nexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Utah Code

76-2-306 Voluntary intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication
negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense; however, if
recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the actor is unaware
of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that
offense.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
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Utah Code

76-4-101 Attempt -- Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he:
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime; and

(b)
(i) intends to commit the crime; or
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an awareness that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly corroborates the
actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (1 )(b).
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed if the attendant .
circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be.
Amended by Chapter 154, 2004 General Session
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Utah Code

76-4-102 Attempt -- Classification of offenses.
(1) Criminal attempt to commit:
(a)
(i) a capital felony, or a felony punishable by imprisonment for life without parole, is a first
degree felony;
(ii) except as provided in Subsection (2), an attempt to commit aggravated murder, Section
76-5-202, which results in serious bodily injury, is punishable by imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of not fewer than 15 years and which may be for life;
{b) except as provided in Subsection (1)(c) or (d), a first degree felony is a second degree felony;
(c) any of the following offenses is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of not fewer than three years and which may be for life:
(i) murder, Subsection 76-5-203(2)(a);
(ii) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; or
(iii) except as provided in Subsection (1 )(d), any of the felonies described in Title 76, Chapter 5,
Part 4, Sexual Offenses, that are first degree felonies;
(d) except as provided in Subsection (3), any of the following offenses is a first degree felony,
punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years and which may be for life:
(i) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1;
(ii) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3; or
(iii) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1;
(e) a second degree felony is a third degree felony;
(f) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor;
(g) a class A misdemeanor is a class 8 misdemeanor;
(h) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor; and
(i) a class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding one half the penalty for a
class C misdemeanor.
(2) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii), a court finds that a lesser term than
the term described in Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) is in the interests of justice and the court states the
reasons for this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less
than:
(a) 10 years and which may be for life; or
(b) six years and which may be for life.
(3) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (1 )(d), a court finds that a lesser term than the
term described in Subsection (1 )(d) is in the interests of justice and states the reasons for this
finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than:
(a) 10 years and which may be for life;
(b) six years and which may be for life; or
(c) three years and which may be for life.
Amended by Chapter 93, 2013 General Session
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Utah Code

76-6-301 Robbery.
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of
force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of
the personal property; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another in
the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation.
·
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation" if it
occurs:
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation;
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
Amended by Chapter 112, 2004 General Session
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Utah Code

76-6-302 Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing
a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
Amended by Chapter 62, 2003 General Session

Q
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Utah Code

75:5.404 Theft -- Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
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Utah Code

76-6-404.5 Wrongful appropriation -- Penalties.
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another, without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to
temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or
legal custodian of possession of the property.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control by the actor is not
presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous
occasion to the control of the property by any person.
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as provided in Section
76-6-412, so that a violation which would have been:
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a third degree felony if it
is wrongful appropriation;
{b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class A misdemeanor if it
is wrongful appropriation;
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class B misdemeanor
if it is wrongful appropriation; and
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class C misdemeanor
if it is wrongful appropriation.
(4) Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of the offense of theft under Section
76-6-404.
Amended by Chapter 48, 2001 General Session
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Addendum C

SIM GILL, Bar No. 6389
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
PETER D. LEAVITT, Bar No. 11407
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (80 I )363-7900

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRYCEDBELL
DOB: 12/15/1982,

AKA:

Assigned to: PETER D. LEA VITT

AMENDED
INFORMATION
DAO# 13009747

.

2105 Summer Ridge Way #11
Taylorsville, UT 84129
D.L.# 166269841

Case No. 131904431

OTN
SO#

Defendant.

The undersigned Deputy District Attorney upon a written declaration states on
information and belief that the defendant, BRYCE D BELL, committed the crime(s) of:
COUNT 1
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 76-6-302 UCA, First Degree Felony, as follows: That on or about
May 05, 2013 at 5500 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant
did (1 )(a) unlawfully and intentionally take or attempt to take personal property in the possession
of another from his or her person, or immediate presence, against his or her will, by means of
force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person pennanently or temporarily of
the personal property; or
(b) intentionally or knowingly use force or fear of immediate force against another in the course
of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation; and in the course of committing said robbery;
and
(2) in the course of committing the before mentioned act,
(a) used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon;
(b) caused serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) took or attempted to take an operable motor vehicle.

....
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STATE vs BRYCE D BELL
DAO# 13009747
Page2
COUNT2
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 76-6-302 UCA, First Degree Felony, as follows; That on or about
May 05, 2013 at 5500 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, Stat~ of Utah, the defendant
did (l)(a) unlawfully and intentionally take or attempt to take personal property in the possession
of another from his or her person, or immediate presence, against his or her will, by means of
force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of
the personal property; or
(b) intentionaHy or knowingly use force or fear of immediate force against another in the course
of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation; and in the course of committing said robbery;
and
(2) in the course of committing the before mentioned act,
(a) used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon;
(b) caused serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) took or attempted to take an operable motor vehicle.
COUNT3
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 76-5-103(1) UCA, Third Degree Felony, as follows: That on or
about May 05, 2013 at 5500 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
defendant did commit assault as defined in Utah Code Section 76-5-102 and used
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Utah Code Section 76-1-601 ; or
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
COUNT4
INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER, 76-8-305 UCA, Class B Misdemeanor, as
follows: That on or about May 05, 2013 at 5500 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the defendant did have knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should
have knowledge, that a peace officer was seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of the
defendant or another and interfered with the arrest or detention by:
(I) the use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perfonn any act required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and ·
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act that would
impede the arrest or detention.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Ben Pender, Moriah Aragon, Shaylynn Balfour, Blake Beynon, Kendra Christensen, J.
Ellis, John Kelly, Stephanie Murray, Ben Pender, Lisa Powell, Mario Rincon, Brenda Ruiz,
Rebecca Sanborn, Robert Simpkins, Josep Tarraso, Hailee Walker,

STATE vs BRYCE D BELL
DAO# 13.009747
Page 3

DECLi-\.RATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
Your declarant bases this Information upon the following:
The statement of Ms. M. Aragon that on May 5, 2013, she went to the AT&T store at
5500 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, with her friends Ms. B. Ruiz and Ms. K.
Christensen. Ms. Christensen noticed a male who was just inside the store was inside Ms. Ruiz
vehicle. All three women responded to the vehicle. The male, later identified as the defendant
here, BRYCE D. BELL, was attempting the start the vehicle. The women ordered the defendant
to get out of the vehicle. The defendant displayed a knife to Ms. Aragon and Ms. Christensen,
and then pointed the knife at Ms. Ruiz. The defendant then grabbed Ms. Ruiz purse, exited the
vehicle, and began running. The women and other bystanders chased the defendant until police
arrived.
The statement of Officer J. Ellis with the Unified Police Department that on May 5, 2013,
he responded to a report of a robbery at 5500 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County. Officer
Ellis observed a male later identified as the defendant being followed by a group of people.
Officer Ellis ordered the defendant to the ground several times and the defendant failed to
comply. The defendant did get on his knees and Officer Ellis attempted to place the defendant in
handcuffs. The defendant attempted to pull his hands away. The defendant was instructed to
stop resisting. Officer Huggard assisted Officer Ellis and they were able to take the defendant
into custody. During a search of the defendant Officer Ellis located a large black knife sheath on
the defendant's belt.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-705
(2008) I declare under criminal penalty of the State
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the
best of my belief and knowledge.
Executed on:

----------

Ben Pender
Declarant
Authorized for presentment and filing
SIM GILL, District Attorney

Deputygmey
10th day of July, 20 I 3
MAH/ /DAO# 13009747

AddendumD

Third District Court, Salt Lake County
State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

VERDICT

BRYCE D. BELL,

CASE NO: 131904431
Defendant

We, the jurors in the above case find verdicts against the defendant, BRYCE D.
BELL, as follows:
Count 1: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
Not Guilty

1!f-Giiilty
Count 2: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
----,,- Not Guilty
ff-Guilty
Count 3:
Not Guilty
~ Guilty of BRANDISHING A DANGEROUS WEAPON IN A FIGHT OR
{j_j QUARREL, a lesser included offense of Count 3
_ _ Guilty of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, as charged in the Information
Count 4: JNTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER
Not Guilty
~Guilty
Dated this·

4

day of October, 2013.

~-

VER.I
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